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The kinds of behaviour to which moral values and disvalues are ascribed are indeed part of the furniture of the world, and so are the natural, descriptive differences between them; but not, perhaps, their differences in value.

— J. L. Mackie Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (1977)

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More quotes by J. L. Mackie

We want people to see it as not only legitimate but right and proper that they should pursue what they see as their own well-being.

Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (1977)

Life is, fortunately, not a continuous application of game theory.

Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (1977)

Mankind is not an agent; it has no unity of decision; it is therefore not confronted with any choices.

Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (1977)

The difficulty of seeing how values could be objective is a fairly strong reason for thinking that they are not so.

Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (1977)

Morality is not to be discovered but to be made: we have to decide what moral views to adopt, what moral stands to take.

Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (1977)

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Quote text and notes from Wikiquote: J. L. Mackie (page history), available under CC BY-SA 4.0. Source quality and labels are our own summary of what Wikiquote records.