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I think that it must in every case depend upon the nature of the transaction, whether the fact not disclosed is such, that it is impliedly represented not to exist; and that must generally be a question of fact proper for a jury.

— Colin Blackburn, Baron Blackburn Lee v. Jones (1864)

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More quotes by Colin Blackburn, Baron Blackburn

Judges could by their resolution alter the practice, but never the law.

Reg. v. Charlesworth (1861)

I do not think there can be the smallest doubt that to sit judicially on Sunday on any business would be indecent and improper, and ought never to be done if it can be helped.

Winsor v. The Queen (1866)

Whatever may be the case in a Court of morals, there is no legal obligation on the vendor to inform the purchaser that he is under a mistake, not induced by the act of the vendor.

Smith v. Hughes (1871)

Whenever there is a real likelihood that the Judge would, from kindred or any other cause, have a bias in favour of one of the parties, it would be very wrong in him to act, and we are not to be understood to say that where there is a real bias of this sort this Court would not interfere.

Reg. v. Rand (1867)

The rule of our law is that the immediate cause, the causa proxima, and not the remote cause, is to be looked at: for, as Lord Bacon says: "It were infinite for the law to judge the causes of causes and their impulsions one of another; therefore it contenteth itself with the immediate cause, and judgeth of acts by that, without looking to any further degree."

Sneesby v. Lancashire and Yorkshire Rail. Co (1874)

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Quote text and notes from Wikiquote: Colin Blackburn, Baron Blackburn (page history), available under CC BY-SA 4.0. Source quality and labels are our own summary of what Wikiquote records.