16 quotes
What makes it possible for cooperation to emerge is the fact that the players might meet again.
The Evolution of Cooperation (1984)
Proposition 5. ALL D is always collectively stable.
The Evolution of Cooperation (1984)
Proposition 3. Any strategy which may be the first to cooperate can be collectively stable only when w is sufficiently large.
The Evolution of Cooperation (1984)
Proposition 4. For a nice strategy to be collectively stable, it must be provoked by the very first defection of the other player.
The Evolution of Cooperation (1984)
Proposition 7. If a nice strategy cannot be invaded by a single individual, it cannot be invaded by any cluster of individuals either.
The Evolution of Cooperation (1984)
Proposition 1. If the discount parameter, w, is sufficiently high, there is no best strategy independent of the strategy used by the other player.
The Evolution of Cooperation (1984)
Just as important as getting cooperation started were the conditions that allowed it to be sustainable. The strategies that could sustain mutual cooperation were the ones which were provocable.
The Evolution of Cooperation (1984)
Proposition 6. The strategies which can invade ALL D in a cluster with the smallest value of p are those which are maximally discriminating, such as TIT FOR TAT.
The Evolution of Cooperation (1984)
Proposition 2. TIT FOR TAT is collectively stable if and only if, w is large enough. This critical value of w is a function of the four payoff parameters, T; R, P, and S.
The Evolution of Cooperation (1984)
The live-and-let-live system that emerged in the bitter trench warfare of World War I demonstrates that friendship is hardly necessary for cooperation based upon reciprocity to get started. Under suitable circumstances, cooperation can develop even between antagonists.
The Evolution of Cooperation (1984)
3. Teach people to care about each other
An excellent way to promote cooperation in a society is to teach people to care about the welfare of others. Parents and schools devote a tremendous effort to teaching the young to value the happiness of others.
The Evolution of Cooperation (1984)
In this chapter Darwin's emphasis on individual advantage has been formalized in terms of game theory. This formulation establishes conditions under which cooperation in biological systems based on reciprocity can evolve even without foresight by the participants.
The Evolution of Cooperation (1984)
The cooperative exchanges of mutual restraint actually changed the nature of the interaction. They tended to make the two sides care about each other's welfare. This change can be interpreted in terms of the Prisoner's Dilemma by saying' that the very experience of sustained mutual cooperation altered the payoffs of the players, making mutual cooperation even more valued than it was before.
The Evolution of Cooperation (1984)
The advice takes the form of four simple suggestions for how to do well in a durable iterated Prisoner's Dilemma: 1. Don't be envious.
2. Don't be the first to defect.
3. Reciprocate both cooperation and defection.
4. Don't be too clever.
The Evolution of Cooperation (1984)
5. Improve recognition abilities The ability to recognize the other player from past interactions, and to remember the relevant features of those interactions, is necessary to sustain cooperation. Without these abilities, a player could not use any form of reciprocity and hence could not encourage the other to cooperate.
The Evolution of Cooperation (1984)
In fact, in the Prisoner's Dilemma, the strategy that works best depends directly on what strategy the other player is using and, in particular, on whether this strategy leaves room for the development of mutual cooperation. This principle is based on the weight of the next move relative to the current move being sufHciently large to make the future important.
The Evolution of Cooperation (1984)